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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In United States v. Gamble, 473 F.2d 1274 (7th
Cir. 1973), the seventh circuit held that a warrant-
less "protective sweep" of a house which resulted in
the seizure of a gun was unjustified. Although the
police were executing an arrest warrant for a
member of a robbery gang, the court ruled that
the officers exceeded the proper scope of a search
incident to an arrest. United States v. Harris2
was distinguished on the basis that other mem-
bers of the gang were not at large, having already
been taken into custody. The court found that
the defendant's reputation as a gunslinger, the
fortress aspect of his house, and the fact that
there had been a gathering earlier in the day there
of 20-30 persons were not sufficient exigent cir-
cumstances.
The second circuit in United States v. Riggs,
474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1973), held that a New York
airport's deputy marshal's request for identifica-
tion and their search of a camera bag were justified
in that probable cause existed for an arrest. "Spe-
cific and articulable facts"' communicated to the
New York deputy marshals by Michigan State
Police provided the justification for an invasion
of defendant's privacy: she had purchased an
airline ticket in Detroit using a different name
from that she used in New York; she had lied
about the contents of a brown paper bag she
opened for inspection on boarding the plane in
Detroit; and she had reminded Detroit Federal
Bureau of Narcotics Agents of a narcotics dealer
known to them. The court stated that when the
defendant opened her purse and exposed to "plain
view" white powder, the New York deputy mar-
shals had probable cause to arrest. Though the
marshals did not arrest her until a test of the
powder found in the purse and camera proved to
be heroin, the court ruled that a search of the
camera would have been justified under the
"grabbing distance" principle of Chimel v. Cal-
ifornia.4
Chimel was found by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in State v. Cross, 206 N.W.2d 371 (Minn.
I See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
2 435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
4 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
1973), to limit a search ircident to a minor-offense
arrest to weapons and evidence of the underlying
crime unless exigent circumstances establish
probable cause to believe that the person is armed
or otherwise dangerous or has committed a more
serious offense. A reliable informer's tip that the
wanted man was in possession of marijuana and a
gun was adequate, according to the court, to pro-
vide the foundation for a belief that exigent circum-
stances existed to warrant a search more extensive
than a pat-down. Without such exigent circum-
stances, the court believed that the Fourth Amend-
ment test of reasonableness precludes anything
more than a pat-down of the garments of a person
arrested for a minor offense.
In United States v. Simmons, 302 F.2d 728 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), the D.C. Court of Appeals set itself in
direct opposition to the D.C. Circuit in United
States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973), a
case involving circumstances notably similar to
those the D.C. court was considering. The D.C.
Court of Appeals held that a full search of a traffic
offender who was arrested and was to be taken
into custody is properly incident to the arrest.
This is contrary to the D.C. Circuit's five to four
decision in Robinson wherein the court there held
the Fourth Amendment precludes anything beyond
a Terry-type5 frisk of the arrestee's outer clothing
for weapons. The D.C. Court of Appeals founded
its disagreement with the D.C. Circuit on the
following: (1) Terry dealt with circumstances
which fell short of establishing probable cause;
(2) Terry standards do not apply to valid arrests;
and (3) an extension of Terry, as in Robinson,
would lead to making the nature of the offense
the key to whether a full search may be under-
taken. This latter result, the D.C. Court of Ap-
peals thought, would create a judicial morass,
complicate the day-to-day performance of the
police officer, and possibly endanger the safety of
the officer.
OBSCENITY
The Roth-Memoirs test 6 was found by the first
circuit in United States v. Palladino, 475 F.2d 65
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6 The test is that (a) the dominant theme of the ma-
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(1st Cir. 1973),'to require experts to guide the
jury in deciding an obscenity issue. While the ex-
perts will not render the process of adjudicating
obscenity a completely rational one, the court
recognized, nonetheless, fundamental fairness
and due process demand that the applicable test
be put in a context which will enable the jurors
to think and experience contemporarily and na-
tionally, the court argued. It was the court's
judgment that a federal law requires an even and
equal application which a jury left to its own
concepts of offensiveness might not render.
An overly broad ordinance banning any outdoor
screen display of certain parts of the female anat-
omy was struck down as unconstitutional by the
seventh circuit in Cinecom Theaters, Inc. v. City
of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1973). The
city's first justification, resting on the protection
of children or minors from harmful material, was
found wanting in that it protected beyond the
concept of variable obscenity.7 The First Amend-
ment, the court determined, extends to children
and protects their freedom of speech and expres-
sion, which the ordinance would curtail. The city's
second justification, involving the protection of
neighbors or passers-by from having offensive
scenes unwillingly thrust upon them, failed to
meet the test of Cohen v. California,8 that sub-
stantial privacy interests were being invaded in
an essentially intolerable manner.
.IMPEACHMEYT
The first, third and fifth circuits found, respec-
tively, that reversed prior convictions, silence at
time of arrest, and wiretaps not yet ruled ad-
missible all conformed with United States v. Harris,
402 U.S. 222 (1971), and were admissible to im-
peach defense statements.
In United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92 (lst Cir.
1973), the first circuit held that prior state con-
victions which had been reversed subsequent to
the start of the federal trial could be used to im-
peach the defendant's claims of entrapment. The
court considered the following factors to be deter-
terial taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest
in sex; (b) it is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters; and (c)
the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).7 See Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
8 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
minative: first, the reversal came not from lack of
counsel9 which might make the resulting con-
viction untrustworthy, but from an unlawful search
and seizure which would actually make the con-
viction more, not less, trustworthy. Second, any
deterrence meant to be brought about by the
exclusion of the invalidly seized evidence had
already been achieved in the case in chief in which
it had been offered. Third, requiring the federal
judge at the beginning of trial to investigate
whether any prior convictions might still be over-
turned would be too demanding. The first circuit
limited its holding to the situation where the
federal trial had begun before the prior convictions
were reversed. The court acknowledged that it
was holding contrary to the fifth circuit in Beto v.
Stacks," a case involving a factual situation vir-
tually identical to the one this court had to ad-
dress.
The third circuit in Burl v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d
234 (3d Cir. 1973), allowed a defendant's failure
to seek aid or to tell someone of an "accidental"
shooting to be used by the prosecution in
its summation to impeach the defendant's state-
ment that the shooting had taken place
accidentally. Originally, the defendant was arrested
for another offense, but within a short time and
distance from the "accidental" shooting. He did
not mention to the arresting officers or to any one
else that he had shot a man accidentally and was
not sure whether the injured man was living or
dead.
In United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1973), the fifth circuit permitted the prosecution
to use wiretaps not determined to be lawful to
impeach the defendant's denial he had engaged
in bookmaking activity. The court found that
Walder v. United States," when joined with United
Slates v. Harris,u2 controlled. Although Walder
was pre-Title lII of the Omnibus Crime Control
Act of 1968,"1 the court believed that section 25151"
of the act left Walder intact.
9 See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
10 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969).
n"347 U.S. 62 (1954).
12401 U.S. 222 (1971).
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seg. (1970).
14 Section 2515 provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been
intercepted, no part of the contents of such com-
munication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any trial... if the
disclosure of that information would be in violation




Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1968 was interpreted in fifth, seventh and ninth
circuit decisions which held wiretap applications
defective. The Minnesota supreme court and the
Essex, New Jersey, county court, considering
state statutes modeled on sections 2516 and 2518
of the federal statute, likewise concluded the
wiretap applications involved were defective.
The fifth circuit in United States v. Robinson,
472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973), and the seventh cir-
cuit in United States v. Roberts, 477 F.2d 57, (7th
Cir. 1973), found that Attorney General Mitchell
had delegated to his Executive Assistant, Mr. Lin-
denbaum, a general authority pursuant to law."
However, both courts interpreted section 2516 as
forbidding the exercise of the function of author-
izing an application for a wiretap by anyone other
than the Attorney General personally or one of
the Assistant Attorneys General especially des-
ignated by the Attorney General. Mr. Lindenbaum
had not been specially designated by the Attorney
General. Therefore, the courts held that all in-
formation obtained by means of the improperly
authorized wiretaps must be suppressed.
In United States v. Chavez, 478 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.
1973), the ninth circuit found a memorandum
by Attorney General Mitchell, a letter by As-
sistant Attorney General Wilson and an applica-
tion for a wiretap an elaborate charade. A later
affidavit by the former Attorney General, Mr.
Mitchell, stated that he had not made a special
15 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1970).
designation of any Assistant Attorney General.
Nevertheless, the court accepted the argument
that substantial compliance with section 2516
had occurred. Yet, it suppressed the evidence on
the basis that section 2518 (1)(a) 16 and (4)(d)17
had not been complied with in that there had not
only been an omission of the required identifica-
tion of the party authorizing the application, but
also a misrepresentation as to who that party was.
The Minnesota supreme court in State v. Frink,
206 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 1973), held that the
Minnesota Privacy of Communications Act 8
allows only the principal prosecuting attorney
within the county to initiate an electronic sur-
velliance and that he could not delegate the ex-
ercise of this power to an assistant. In suppressing
evidence derived from the invalid wiretap, the
court found its holding in conformity with federal
interpretation of the federal statute.
In State v. Cocuzza, 301 A.2d 204 (NJ. 1973),
the Essex, New Jersey, county court suppressed
evidence derived from a wiretap it held invalid
because not in conformity with the state statute
authorizing electronic surveillance." The court
held that delegation of his authority by the county
prosecutor to an assistant fell short of the statutory
requirement.
16 Section 2518 (1) (a) provides that each "application
for an order... shall... include.., the identity of...
the officer authorizing the application." 18 U.S.C.§ 2518 (1)(a) (1970).
17 Section 2518 (4) (d) provides the same requirement
as to identity for the order as for the application. 18
U.S.C. § 2518 (4)(d) (1970).
"8 MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 626A (1946-48).
19 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 156A-8 (1931).
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